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I. Introduction
On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.' The Court held
that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 2 which entitles aliens to sue
before federal courts for torts committed in violation of
international law, does not apply when "all the relevant conduct
took place outside the United States."3 It maintained that its
decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank,4 which held that
"[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none,"' governed the interpretation of the ATS.6
The Court concluded that, without indications that Congress
t Contract Professor of International Law and European Union Law at Bocconi School
of Law, Milan (Italy); LL.M. Yale Law School (2007); Ph.D. International Law &
Economics, Bocconi University (2007). The Author wishes to thank Pietro Fazzini and
Pablo Sandoval for their precious suggestions.
I Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011).
3 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
4 Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
5 Id. at 2878.
6 The Court stated the presumption against extraterritoriality did apply to the ATS
despite its jurisdictional nature as opposed to the substantive issue that controlled in
Morrison. See id at 2881; Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1660-61. In fact, "the principles
underlying the canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of
actions that may be brought under the ATS." Id., 133 S. Ct. at 1660-61.
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clearly gave the ATS application outside the United States, the
statute does not apply extraterritorially.'
This note explores the consequences of Kiobel on transnational
human rights litigation in U.S. courts.' Human rights lawyers and
advocates feared and continue to fear that Kiobel is the death knell
for transnational human rights actions in U.S. federal courts.9
Among them is the famous former U.N. Secretary General's
Special Representative for Business and Human Rights, John G.
Ruggie, who predicted that, should the Court agree with the
defendants, "there would be little if anything left of the ATS."o
The point is subtle." The ATS is commonly considered to play a
fundamental role in creating a cultural human rights framework
for multinational enterprises.12 If this is true, limiting its reach
would significantly weaken, and ultimately vanquish, its capacity
to favor the promotion of human rights at the global level. 3
Alarmist concern notwithstanding, there is not much to fear,
for at least two reasons. First, Kiobel did not sign a death sentence
7 "In the end, nothing in the text of the ATS evinces the requisite clear indication
of extraterritoriality." Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666.
8 Nowadays, the ATS plays a prominent role in international human rights
litigation. See Julian Ku, Response: Rethinking the Direction of the Alien Tort Statute,
100 GEO. L.J. 2217, 2218 (2011-2012) (noting that "as ATS cases became more
frequent[], legal scholars and advocates began to focus on the ATS as a crucial
mechanism for developing . .. international human rights law."); Eric A. Posner, Climate
Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L.
REv. 1925, 1928 (2007) (noting that the ATS "is the most prominent and effective means
for litigating international human rights claims."); Jaykumar Menon, Alien Tort Statute,
in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 240-41 (Antonio
Cassese, ed., 2009) (noting that the ATS is "a prominent vehicle for the litigation of
international human rights claims in the domestic federal courts of the United States").
9 See, e.g., Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 at 18 ("Limiting the ATS
to exclude [extraterritorial] claims, in many cases, would deny the possibility of justice
to all such persons.").
10 JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 196 (2013).
11 See id.
12 See Charles W. Brower, Calling All NGOs: A Discussion of the Continuing
Vitality of the Alien Tort Statute as a Tool in the Fight for International Human Rights in
the Wake of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 26 WHITrIER L. REv. 929, 949 (2004-05) (arguing
that "[ATS] litigation has been, by far, the most effective means of accomplishing long-
term progress towards protecting individuals from egregious human rights abuses").
13 See id.
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for the ATS because it only eliminated from future ATS litigation
those ATS actions discussed in Morrison: so-called F-cubed ATS
actions in which foreign defendants are sued for conduct that took
place entirely within foreign territory.14 All other actions remain
within the reach of U.S. courts.'
Second, the Court's focus on the issue of the statute's
extraterritoriality, instead of corporate liability, limited the ruling's
scope. 6 Even after Kiobel, the issue of corporate liability under
the ATS remains unsettled." As it stands now, U.S.-based
corporations can be lawfully sued before federal courts, while
foreign companies can be subject to the ATS only under certain
conditions.'" In other words, even if it is hard to deny that Kiobel
significantly restricted the reach of the ATS,19 the restriction is
nonetheless not as expansive as one may think at first glance.20
This logic will be explained in several parts. Part II discusses
the question of ATS's extraterritoriality, which was decided by
several courts prior to Kiobel and in other ATS proceedings.2'
Part III discusses Morrison in more depth,2 2 while Part IV
examines Kiobel.23 The two judgments are bound to each other, as
the Supreme Court used the former to decide the latter.24 Part V
presents a reading of Kiobel that keeps the door ajar for many
human rights lawsuits based on the ATS, thus responding to the
question raised previously. 25  Part VI offers some concluding
thoughts.26
14 See infra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 119-146 and accompanying text.
16 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring).
17 See id
18 See id.
I9 See id.
20 See infra notes 119-146 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 27-58 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 59-92 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 93-118 and accompanying text.
24 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
25 See infra notes 119-146 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
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II. Extraterritoriality and the ATS
Pursuant to the ATS, aliens can sue before federal courts "for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."2 7 This provision was enacted by the
Continental Congress in 1789 in response to certain aggressions
committed by individuals against foreign agents.28 Because of its
"archaic inscrutability and almost homeopatic brevity, [the ATS]
creates conceptual headaches at every turn."2 9 In fact, some terms
like "jurisdiction,"30 "civil action,"3 ' and "alien"3 2 are self-
explanatory; in contrast, the provision fails to establish whether
27 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011). The general literature on the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS), sometimes also called "Alien Tort Claims Act" (ATCA), cannot be entirely
reported here.
28 On May 17 and 19, 1784, Chevalier Charles Julian de Longchamps first insulted
and then assaulted the French Consul General to the United States, Francis Barbe
Marbois. Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. 111, 118 (1784). Three years later, a
constable in New York entered the private house of the Dutch minister plenipotentiary to
arrest a servant. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute andArticle III, 42 VA. J. INT'L
L. 587, 641-42 (2002). "These incidents highlight public awareness of the
Confederation Congress's general inability to redress law of nations violations in the
states." Anthony J. Bellia & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of
Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 467 (2011).
29 Andrew J. Wilson, Beyond Unocal: Conceptual Problems in Using International
Norms to Hold Transnational Corporations Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, in
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (Olivier De Schutter, ed., 2006).
30 WILLIAM M. RICHMAN ET. AL., UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 14 (2003)
("Judicial jurisdiction in the most inclusive sense refers to the power or ability of a court
to hear a dispute and render a valid judgment-valid in the sense that it will be
recognized by other courts.").
31 The existing differences between tort law and criminal law are well-established
among scholars as well as in practice. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort
Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 719-21
(2007-08). See also David Friedman, Beyond the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 103, 108-09 (1996). First, the State is in charge of prosecuting violations of
criminal law, whereas in tort proceedings, the victim may choose whether to take any
action. Simons, supra note 31, at 719. Second, while tort law requires a harm in every
case, criminal law does not. Id. at 720. Third, criminal law's sanctions involve the loss
of life or liberty, while the victim of a tort may seek only a monetary remedy. Id.
Fourth, proportionality is demanded in criminal law, while in tort law, the
proportionality of redress is more tenuously connected to the harm whose remedy is
sought. Id. at 720-21.
32 The term "alien" includes both individuals and corporations. See Barrow S.S.
Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 106 (1898) (holding that the term in the Judiciary Act has
always been interpreted "to include corporations").
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the substantive regime of "tort" is determined by domestic or
international law,33 or where the violation of the "law of nations"3 4
must be "committed" in order for federal courts to obtain
jurisdiction.3 5 In this last respect, one may characterize the ATS as
"geoambiguous." 6
Given these elements, it is no surprise that federal courts found
no apparent obstacle in expanding the ATS by applying it in
lawsuits with no significant connection to the U.S. A typical
example in this respect is the very first ATS case, Filartiga v.
Peha-Irala.17  In Filartiga, the plaintiffs were the Paraguayan
family of a young boy who had been tortured and ultimately killed
33 Compare John Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding that "the law of the United States and not the law of nations must provide the
rule of decision in [an] ATS lawsuit") with Kadic v. Karadfic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir.
1995) (discussing whether the violations claimed by the plaintiffs constituted violations
of international law) and Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) ("We have repeatedly emphasized that the scope
of the [ATS]'s jurisdictional grant should be determined by reference to international
law.") and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
34 The law of nations, today called international law, is based in large part upon
two sources: customs and treaties. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1),
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. Custom constitutes "evidence of a
general practice accepted as law." Id. It "does mirror the characteristic of the
decentralised international system, [as] it reflects the consensus approach to decision-
making with the ability of the majority to create new law binding upon all, while the
very participation of states encourages their compliance with customary rules."
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (6th ed., 2008). Compared to custom,
treaties are "a more direct and formal method of international law creation." Id. at 902.
On the mechanisms concerning the implementation of international law in the U.S. legal
system, see Paul R. Dubinsky, United States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC
LEGAL SYSTEMS 631 (Dinah Shelton, ed., 2011).
35 As one secondary source reported before Kiobel, the ATS does not require "any
connection between conduct, victim or perpetrator and the United States-indeed, the
only textual requirements imposed by the ATS are that the plaintiff must not be a US
citizen and that the cause of action is a tort under the laws on nations." INTERNATIONAL
BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 112
(2008).
36 Laws can be characterized as "geoambiguous" when they "proscribe or regulate
conduct but . .. remain silent about whether they apply to acts that occur outside of the
United States." Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule
for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REv. 110, 114 (2010).
37 Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2013 175
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
in Paraguay by the defendant, a Paraguayan police officer."8 The
court found it had jurisdiction under the ATS,3 9 and Filcirtiga
inaugurated a new wave of ATS jurisprudence.40
Most cases of this first wave involved foreigners suing other
foreigners in the U.S. in relation to conduct that happened
abroad.4 1 For instance, in Kadic v. Karadgic,4 2 the same court
found the ATS was applicable to conduct performed by
individuals irrespective of whether it implicated governmental
action, so the ATS's jurisdiction extended to all individual acts
committed in violation of international law.43
Even the first ATS case discussed before the Supreme Court
was extraterritorial. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,44 the Court dealt
with the kidnapping of a Mexican doctor in Mexico.45 Although
the Court took the chance to establish guidance for lower courts'
interpretation of the statute,46 it never questioned the ATS's
applicability to the facts of the case.47
Accordingly, lower courts were perfectly comfortable in
38 Id. at 878.
39 Id. at 889 (concluding that "federal jurisdiction may properly be exercised over
the Filartigas' claim").
40 See Terry Collingsworth, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The Key
Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTs. J.
183, 188 (2002) (arguing that since Filartiga, "the [ATS] has been used with increasing
frequency to reach direct perpetrators of human rights abuses").
41 See Kadic v. Karadific, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
42 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 232.
43 Id. at 239.
44 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
45 Id. at 697.
46 In Sosa, the Court ruled the jurisdictional prong of the ATS was limited. Id. at
712. First, the ATS did not confer a cause of action, but "was intended as jurisdictional
in the sense of addressing the power of courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain
subject." Id. at 714. Second, not all causes would ground actions under the ATS, but
only those "rest[ing] on a norm of international character .. . defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized." Id. at
725. Third, lower courts were called to pay special attention to "the practical
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts." Id. at
732. In this respect, "the judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that
the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of
international norms today." Id. at 729.
47 Id. at 763.
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considering Sosa as the positive example-an implicit statement
by the Court indeed-that the ATS could plainly apply to events
that happened outside the U.S. For instance, in Flomo v.
Firestone,4 8 Judge Posner, speaking for the Court of Appeals of
the Seventh Circuit, examined and vigorously rejected Firestone's
argument that the ATS could not apply to events that took place
wholly in its Liberian plantations.4 9 Posner maintained, in
particular, that "[c]ourts have been applying the statute
extraterritorially ... since the beginning; no court to our
knowledge has ever held that it doesn't apply
extraterritorially. . . .""o Moreover, in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil,"
the D.C. Circuit Court reached the same conclusion, based on "the
Supreme Court's failure to disapprove of [extraterritorial] lawsuits
in Sosa."5 2 In truth, courts have not solely relied on Sosa, but also
referred to the ATS's text and history.5 3 According to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, the existence of piracy
among the possible torts actionable under the ATS, as well as the
statute's text and history, "are all indications of extraterritorial
applicability."54
Scholars have reflected on the extraterritoriality of the ATS as
well. Some have noted, in this respect, that Sosa "did not limit the
ATS to scenarios in which the United States might have an
affirmative obligation to prevent the violation of international law
or otherwise ... worry about its own compliance with
international law.""s Others, while criticizing the ATS from the
standpoint of global welfare and economic analysis, have stated
that the ATS's extraterritorial application ultimately favors local
48 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011).
49 Id. at 1025.
50 Id.
51 John Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
52 Id. at 27 ("Given Congress's ratification of ATS lawsuits involving foreign
conduct and the Supreme Court's failure to disapprove of such lawsuits in Sosa, we
conclude that the extraterritoriality canon does not bar appellants from seeking relief
based on Exxon's alleged aiding and abetting of international law violations committed
in Indonesia.").
53 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct.
1995 (2013).
54 Id.
55 Ingrid Wuerth, Remarks, 106 AM. Soc'YINT'LL. PROC.490, 491 (2012).
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competitors and harms U.S. companies operating abroad.56 Even
so, the ATS does not require the application of U.S. law, but rather
application of the "law of nations."" Therefore, the ATS's
jurisdictional prong is purely adjudicatory, and not prescriptive."
In conclusion, despite criticisms raised of the extraterritorial
application of the ATS in the past, its extraterritorial applicability
appeared a well-settled principle, established in case law and
accepted among scholars.
III. Morrison and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The Kiobel Court broke with this trend and, relying heavily on
Morrison v. Australia National Bank, determined that the ATS did
not apply extraterritorially.5 9 Morrison involved a class of
Australian investors alleging that a fraud had been orchestrated
against them by the defendants, a group of Australian citizens.60
The case can be characterized as an "F-cubed action"-in other
words, "an action by [a] non-US foreigner suing on shares of a
foreign company bought on a foreign exchange." 6 1 The only
56 Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien
Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2202 (2011-12)
("[W]hen the tort occurs abroad, it will often be the case that a corporation accused of
malfeasance, and subject to suits in the United States, will have actual or potential
competitors abroad that are not subject to suit here for comparable conduct . ... [T]he
result ... may be the diversion of foreign business opportunities to less efficient
competitors .... ). This is what actually happened with the Canadian company
Talisman Energy: After the beginning of hostile litigation before American courts, it
retired from Sudan and was quickly replaced by a Chinese company in local investments,
despite eventually prevailing on a motion to dismiss before the Second Circuit. See id. at
2195.
57 William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Fallacy, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 35 (2010), http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/05/
online 51 dodge/.
58 See id. at 37 ("Courts do not apply U.S. substantive law in ATS cases; they
apply customary international law.. . . In international law terms, the kind of
jurisdiction courts exercise in ATS cases is not jurisdiction to prescribe but jurisdiction
to adjudicate. It is the same kind of jurisdiction that courts exert in conflict-of-laws
cases when they apply law that is not made by their own sovereign to parties over whom
they have personal jurisdiction.").
59 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668.
60 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
61 Thomas A. Dubbs, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: The US Supreme
Court Limits Collective Redress for Securities Fraud, in EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND
COLLECTIVE REDRESS 335, 338 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva Lein eds., 2012). F-cubed
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connection with the U.S. present in Morrison was that the leading
defendant corporation had a wholly owned subsidiary in Florida,
one HomeSide Lending, Inc.62 Plaintiffs accused HomeSide and
its executives of manipulating the company's valuation models to
overstate the mortgage value of homes whose purchase it financed,
harming the investors.6 3 All the fraud allegedly took place in
Florida.64
The applicable statute was Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, together with SEC Rule 1 Ob-5.65 Both aim
to prevent and punish those persons who
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered ... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.66
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia established a presumption
against extraterritoriality potentially applicable to any statute-the
same that Kiobel, accordingly, applied to the ATS. 67  The
presumption is that "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the jurisdiction of the
United States," 6 so that "[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication
of an extraterritorial application, it has none."69 In this respect,
since the 1960s, U.S. courts have determined the jurisdictional
reach of Section 10(b) using a conduct-effects test.70 In brief,
securities actions are "collective lawsuits, often attorney-driven rather than client-
centered, in which foreign investors sue[] foreign defendants in the United States for
misrepresentations connected to transactions occurring abroad." Marco Ventoruzzo,
Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation after Morrison: Correcting
the Supreme Court's "Transactional Test," 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 407 (2011-12).
62 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
63 Id. at 2875-76.
64 Id. at 2883-84.
65 Id. at 2875.
66 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2011).
67 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882-83.
68 Id. at 2877.
69 Id. at 2878.
70 Id. at 2889.
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when the conduct or its effects have some connection with the
United States, U.S. courts have jurisdiction.7 1 As to the requisite
intensity of such a connection with respect to conduct, different
circuits adopted different standards.72 In this regard, some courts
required the connection to consist of "substantial acts," while
others command proper causation.73  Moreover, in order to assert
jurisdiction under Section 10(b), courts have required that the
transaction have substantial adverse effects on the U.S. market.74
In Morrison, the Supreme Court "demanded a clear break with this
longstanding practice."
In particular, Scalia established the presumption against
extraterritoriality by relying on a canon of statutory interpretation
in order to eradicate the "unpredictable and inconsistent
[results]"76 of the traditional conduct-effects test.77 Speaking for
the Court, Scalia was concerned that a presumption to the contrary
would deprive Congress of the "stable background" necessary to
"legislate with predictable effects."" He reasoned that the
presumption against extraterritoriality was justified by "the
advantage of a clear brightline rule rather than an ambiguous case-
by-case assessment."79
7 Id.
72 See Brett R. Marshall, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.: A Clear
Statement Rule or a Confusing Standard, 37 J. CORP. L. 204, 209-211 (2011-12)
(discussing certain courts' slightly different approaches to the conduct-effects test).
73 See id. (explaining that the Second Circuit demands that substantial fraudulent
acts occur within the U.S. for a foreign plaintiffs case to be heard, and that the D.C.
Circuit requires all elements to result from conduct committed in the U.S.).
74 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding that
"the language and purpose of [the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934] show that it was
not meant to exempt transactions that are conducted outside the jurisdiction of the United
States").
75 Paul B. Stephan, Introductory Note to U.S. Supreme Court: Morrison v.
Australia Nat'1 Bank Ltd., 49 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1217 (2010).
76 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880.
77 Id. at 2880-81.
78 Id. at 2881. Also, the majority reasoned that, with respect to the conduct-effects
analysis, "[t]he results of judicial-speculation-made-law--divining what Congress would
have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court-demonstrate the wisdom
of the presumption against extraterritoriality." Id
79 Linda J. Silberman, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for
Global Securities Class Actions, in EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS
363, 367.
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In addition, the presumption embodied a "longstanding
principle of American law,"so which had been recognized in
previous cases. In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.," for
example, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,82 which outlaws discriminatory
employment practices based on race, color, sex, and nationality,
applied to employment contracts between U.S. citizens employed
abroad by American employers." The Court required the
petitioner, a U.S. citizen born in Lebanon, to "demonstrat[e] the
affirmative congressional intent required to extend the protection
of Title VII beyond [U.S.] territorial borders."8 4 The Court
observed:
Congress knows how to place the high seas within the
jurisdictional reach of a statute ... [and] Congress' awareness of
the need to make a clear statement that a statute applies overseas
is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it
has expressly legislated the extraterritorial application of a
statute.s
What the petitioner was required to do was to "present
sufficient affirmative evidence"" in favor of Title VII's
extraterritorial reach, and he failed." As Justice Marshall
reasoned in his dissent, the presumption against extraterritoriality
became "a barrier to any genuine inquiry into the sources that
reveal Congress' actual intentions.""
Applied to Kiobel, Morrison presents two questions. First,
whether sufficient evidence exists that Congress intended the ATS
to reach human rights violations committed abroad." This was the
80 Kiobel, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
81 Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244
(1991).
82 Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (2011).
83 Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 244.
84 Id. at 249.
85 Id
86 Id. at 259.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 278 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89 See infra notes 93-118 and accompanying text.
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question answered-negatively-by the Kiobel Court, as will be
explicated in the next part.9 0 The second question is whether
Kiobel's holding really establishes a brightline rule for future
transnational human rights litigation. In other words, what are the
circumstances in which human rights advocates and lawyers can
still exploit the ATS to vindicate the rights of victims of human
rights abuses, after Kiobel?9' This question is answered in the fifth
part.92
IV. An Analysis of Kiobel
Kiobel was an action brought against certain companies of the
Anglo-Dutch Shell group by inhabitants of Ogoniland, a region in
the country where Shell was conducting oil drilling and extraction
activities.93  The plaintiffs claimed that Shell's subsidiaries,
operating in Nigeria since 1958, had committed atrocities in
complicity with the Nigerian government, in particular murder,
torture, crimes against humanity, and property destruction.94 The
90 See infra notes 93-118 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 119-146 and accompanying text.
92 See infra notes 119-146 and accompanying text.
93 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662-63.
94 The trial started in 1996 with a lawsuit against Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and
Shell Transport and Trading Co., which soon filed a motion to dismiss. Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96-8386, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23064, at *I (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
28, 1998), aff'dsub nom, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
The district court granted the motion and, accordingly, dismissed the proceeding on
forum non conveniens grounds, maintaining that U.K. courts were a more appropriate
forum to hear the case. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further
proceedings, ruling that the U.S. was an appropriate forum for this kind of dispute.
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd sub nom, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013). The proceeding reached the discovery stage, but District Court Judge
Kimba M. Wood invited the parties to clarify the impact of the Supreme Court decision
in Sosa on the proceedings, so the final ruling was delayed. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 456 F.Supp.2d 457, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013). A second action was brought against Brian Anderson, former
managing director of the Nigerian subsidiary of the group. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., No. 96-8386, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,
2002), rev'd sub nom, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). The defendant moved for a motion to
dismiss, but the district court rejected it (except for two allegations, for which it asked
the plaintiffs for supplemental briefing), maintaining that the case had been properly set
forth before the court. Id. at *1-3. A third action was initiated in 2004 against Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), and again the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., No. 02-7618, renumbered No.
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs'
claims, arguing that the plaintiffs had no standing under the ATS
to pursue actions against corporate defendants because
international law, which grounds all ATS causes of action under
Sosa, does not contemplate corporate liability for torts.95
Initially, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this
question.9 6 After the first argument, however, it decided to change
the subject, shifting from corporate liability to extraterritoriality.97
The reasons for this shift probably lay in the division among the
Justices, between pro- and anti-ATS wings, which required the
Court to find a less divisive and more acceptable question on
which a majority or unanimity could agree.98 Therefore, the ruling
centered on whether the ATS applies to "violations of the law of
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States."9 9 The Court resorted to the presumption against
extraterritoriality established in Morrison: for the ATS to have
04-2665, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16592, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2008), aff'd, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013). The court granted the motion and denied the plaintiffs' request for
further jurisdictional discovery. Id. at *1, *5. The plaintiffs filed an appeal. Wiwa v.
Shell, 335 Fed. Appx. 81, 83 (2009), rev'd sub nom, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). On April 8,
2009, the parties entered into a $15.5 million settlement with regard to all said
proceedings. Shell Settles Nigeria Deaths Case, BBC NEWS (June 9, 2009, 9:43 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/8090493.stm.
95 The ATS action was filed by Esther Kiobel and others in 2002. Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 457, 457-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). The lead plaintiff was acting on behalf of Barinem Kiobel,
an activist opposing the exploitation and pollution of the Niger Delta in the Ogoni
region. Id. at 457-59. The claim was similar to the one brought in Wiwa and concerned
the illegitimate detention, killing, and execution of activists by the Nigerian Government
in complicity with Shell Group companies operating in the area. See id. at 464-67
(relying on Wiwa as persuasive authority).
96 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011), cert. granted, 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
97 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (ordering to clarify "[w]hether and under what
circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the
law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
States."). For an analysis, see RUGGIE, supra note 10, at 194-96.
98 Peter Henner, When is a Corporation a Person? When it Wants to Be. Will
Kiobel End Alien Tort Statute Litigation?, 12 Wyo. L. REv. 303, 304 (2012) ("It
appear[ed] that the Court [wa]s badly fractured between [a] pro-ATS wing (Justices
Breyer, Ginsberg, and Kagan) and the conservative anti-ATS wing (Justices Roberts,
Alito, Scalia, and Thomas).").
99 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
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extraterritorial reach, the Court reasoned, an authorization from
Congress was required."'o The Court then concluded such
authorization did not exist.'0 ' To reach this conclusion, Chief
Justice Roberts's opinion dealt with three aspects: the text, the
history, and the purpose of the ATS.102
First, the Court stated, "nothing in the text of the statute
suggests that Congress intended causes of action recognized under
it to have extraterritorial reach."l03 The reference the ATS makes
to "any civil action," to international law, and to torts, seemed to
the Court to be insufficient to establish that Congress sought its
applicability to extend extraterritorially.10 4
Second, regarding the ATS's historical background, the Court
recalled-mentioning William Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England-that Sosa restricted the scope of the ATS to
three specific breaches of international law existing in 1789: the
violation of safe conducts, the breach of the rights of ambassadors,
and piracy.' The first two violations appeared to motivate the
first Continental Congress to enact the ATS; yet, the inclusion of
piracy would support more clearly the statute's extraterritorial
applicability.106 Piracy, in fact, is the classical-and maybe the
first-international crime punished by all states, even if committed
outside their individual territories, especially on the high seas.0 7
The Court, however, denied that "the existence of a cause of
action against [pirates] is a sufficient basis for concluding that
other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does
100 Id. at 1665.
101 Id
102 Id.
103 Id
104 Id.
105 According to the Supreme Court, "[t]here was ... a sphere in which these rules
binding individuals for the benefit of other individuals overlapped with the norms of
state relationships. Blackstone referred to it when he mentioned three specific offenses
against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of England: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
106 See Zachary Mills, Does the World Need Knights Errant to Combat Enemies of
All Mankind-Universal Jurisdiction, Connecting Links, and Civil Liability, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1315, 1344-49 (2009).
107 "Universal jurisdiction developed around the crime of piracy," and "the exercise
of universal jurisdiction by national courts has become more common in recent years."
Id. at 1322, 1328.
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occur within the territory of another sovereign.""08 Actually,
"piracy involves conduct in places outside of any nation's
territorial jurisdiction, such as most notably [the] high seas,"'0 9
and, at the end of the eighteenth century, it was considered an
exception, perhaps notably the only one, to the purely territorial
jurisdiction of each state."o
In particular, the Court mentioned the opinion issued by
Attorney General William Bradford in 1795 concerning the
plunder of the coasts of Sierra Leone by U.S. private citizens in
violation of the neutrality of the United States in the war between
France and Great Britain."' Even though lower courts disagreed
as to the real implications of Bradford's opinion" 2 and therefore a
clarification could have been useful, the Court stopped short of
adopting a potentially "definitive reading"' of that opinion,
which it considered "hardly suffic[ient] to counter the weighty
concerns underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality.""14
Finally, the Court focused on the ATS's purpose. Some
opinions of the time indicate that Congress intended the ATS to
serve as a means for the United States to regain the trust of other
nations at the international level, and not to create an unusual
forum for enforcement of international legal norms."' In this
respect, there is no indication that Congress sought the ATS to
establish U.S. courts' jurisdiction for extraterritorial torts.1 6
Indeed, the contrary is true, as certain foreign powers, such as
108 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
109 Curtis A. Bradley, Attorney General Bradford's Opinion and the Alien Tort
Statute, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 509, 511 (2012).
I10 See id. (pointing out that "[a] conclusion that the ATS historically could have
been used to address piracy would not necessarily show .. . that the ATS also extended
to conduct committed within the territory of a foreign sovereign . . .
I Breach of Neutrality, I Op. Att'y. Gen. 57 (1795).
112 Bradley, supra note 109, at 515 (noting that "[s]ome judges have concluded that
the Bradford opinion supports application of the ATS to conduct in foreign countries.
Other judges have argued that the opinion supports only the exercise of ATS jurisdiction
in the United States and on the high seas. Still other judges have contended that, to the
extent that the opinion supports the extraterritorial application of the ATS, this is true
only for conduct by U.S. citizens.").
113 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668.
I 14 Id
115 Id
116 Id. at 1666.
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Canada, Germany, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, to
mention only a few, are now protesting the exercise of jurisdiction
by U.S. courts over foreign individuals and entities for acts
committed in their territories."' The Court, therefore, concluded
that the ATS is deeply connected with foreign policy, which is a
matter properly reserved as the province of the legislature.'18
V. Kiobel's Legacy
The question remains whether Kiobel, which imitates
Morrison in several respects, actually provides a clear standard for
determining which transnational claims are actionable under the
ATS. As two concurring opinions plainly admitted, the decision
in Kiobel "is careful to leave open a number of significant
questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the [ATS]."ll 9
As a result, there is still significant room to bring actions under the
ATS, especially given the fact that "the First Congress did not
intend the provision to be 'stillborn."'l 2 0
First, Kiobel's factual background corresponded to a typical F-
cubed action, like Morrison's. As mentioned previously, the latter
involved a lawsuit brought by Australian investors, mostly against
Australian defendants, relating to investment transactions entered
into in Australia.121 Morrison, as Justice Ginsburg noted during
the argument, "has 'Australia' written all over it." 22 The same
was true of Kiobel.'2 3 The lawsuit concerned human rights
violations committed by the Nigerian military against the Ogoni
population in Nigeria.124  The defendants' presence in the United
States was limited to an office in New York City, owned by a
subsidiary affiliated company.125  The case had, therefore, no
117 Id. at 1669.
IIs Id. (noting that "far from avoiding diplomatic strife, providing such a cause of
action could have generated it.").
119 Id. (Kennedy, J. concurring). In addition, according to Justice Alito's
concurrence, the opinion "obviously leaves much unanswered, and perhaps there is
wisdom in the Court's preference for this narrow approach." Id. at 1669-70.
120 Id. at 1663 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714).
121 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
122 Dubbs, supra note 61, at 335.
123 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
124 Id
125 Id. at 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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connection with the United States other than the plaintiffs residing
in the country on a refugee status. 126 As a result of the Kiobel
decision, the exclusion of an extraterritorial application of the ATS
affects F-cubed actions only.127
Second, Kiobel does not impact pending or future F-squared
actions, i.e., those where one of the three elements considered-
the citizenship of the plaintiff, the citizenship of the defendant, or
the situs of the occurrences which ground the claim-is
substantially connected with U.S. soil, thus removing one of its
"F," or foreign, attributes. As a consequence, when the defendant
is (1) a U.S. citizen, (2) a company incorporated in the United
States, or (3) an alien who finds him or herself in the United
States, or if the conduct underlying the action occurred within the
United States, the decision in Kiobel does not limit the ATS's
applicability. 128 Actions like Filcirtiga-where the defendant was
irregularly residing in the United States 29-and those where the
alleged transaction took place in the United States would,
therefore, still be within the reach of the ATS.130 It seems quite
well established, in this regard, that the First Congress "meant to
grant the district courts original jurisdiction over 'all causes where
an alien sues,' not just those in which the defendant was a U.S.
citizen."' 3 1 In particular, the ATS would still cover actions against
U.S. citizens and entities incorporated in the United States for
violations committed abroad, such as the one against Exxon Mobil
Corp. 13 2 On the contrary, cases like Sarei v. Rio Tinto,133 the
126 Id. at 1662-63.
127 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
128 Id
129 Filirtiga, 630 F.2d at 878-80.
130 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct at 1669 (Breyer, J., concurring).
131 William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 701 (2001-02) (quoting the
Judiciary Act, ch. 20 § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), full quote stating: "all causes where an
alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States") (omitted text in italics).
132 See, e.g., Exxon, 654 F.3d at 11. However, on July 26, 2013, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the judgment in that case and remanded the ATS
claims to district court for further consideration in light of Kiobel. Doe v. Exxon, No.
09-7125, 2013 U.S. App. Westlaw 3970103, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2013).
133 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 185 L. Ed. 2d 863 (2013), order vacating and
remanding 671 F.3d 736, 744 (9th Cir. 2011), in light of Kiobel.
2013 187
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
underlying conduct of which took place entirely in Papua New
Guinea, should be evaluated carefully in light of Kiobel's
restrictive holding (and likely dismissed).13 4
Third, ATS actions may still concern corporate defendants. In
this respect, the shift in certiorari from corporate liability to
extraterritoriality permitted preservation of all lawsuits brought
against corporations that are compatible with Kiobel.135 In other
words, the shift allowed the Court to save the pending and future
actions against corporations, with much hope (and satisfaction,
one could say) for plaintiffs' lawyers and human rights activists.13 6
As a result, the claim that the post-Kiobel ATS is dead and buried
is a clear overstatement. 37
Additionally, according to the Court, the ATS still would be
applicable when "the claims touch and concern the territory of the
United States." Nevertheless, these claims must have "sufficient
force"' 39 to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality and, in
addition, "it would reach too far to say that mere corporate
presence suffices."'4 0 This limiting dicta referred to corporations
with "[a] minimal and indirect American presence" 4 ' (such as an
office), not to those engaged in more intense activity on U.S.
soil.14 2  As a matter of practice, courts now will be required to
determine the intensity of corporate defendants' presence in the
United States, an element that case law had thus far mostly
134 See id.
135 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
136 See id. at 1663 (shifting focus of the analysis). See also id. at 1669 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (addressing "serious violations of international law principles protecting
persons" which may require "elaboration and exploration.").
137 See, e.g., Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: The Death of the ATS and the
Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, OpINIoJulus (April 17, 2013),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-the-rise-of-
transnational-tort-litigation/.
138 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Breyer, J., concurring).
'39 Id.
140 id
141 In fact, "it would be farfetched to believe, based solely upon the defendants'
minimal and indirect American presence, that this legal action helps to vindicate a
distinct American interest, such as in not providing a safe harbor for an 'enemy of all
mankind."' Id. at 1678 (Breyer, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 1665-66, 1669.
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disregarded. 143
Finally, still potentially included within the reach of the ATS
is the situation in which the defendant takes refuge in the United
States. The fact that an individual has committed violations of
international law abroad and sought asylum in the United States
gives rise to "a distinct interest in preventing the United States
from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal
liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind."' 4 4
Hence, the point made by Kiobel is that the United States should
not "pretend ... to be the custos morum of the whole world"'45
and it should not transform itself-as Justice Scalia pointed out in
Morrison-into "the Shangri-La of class-action litigation for
lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign
[territories]."l46 It would be no surprise if lower courts were
called, in the near future, to respond to cases exactly like these.
VI. Conclusion
Kiobel will ignite debate on its various aspects and
implications. It is no wonder that it was initially characterized as
"a virtual earthquake of an opinion."'4 7 What this note has argued
is that, despite its apparently devastating results, Kiobel still, albeit
limitedly, has an impact on transnational human rights litigation in
U.S. courts.'48 Lawyers and courts still have work to do in order to
properly interpret the ATS.
As Justice Kennedy pointed out in his concurrence, "[o]ther
cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of
international law principles protecting persons, cases [not]
covered ... by the reasoning and holding of today's case; and in
those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption
against extraterritorial application may require some further
elaboration and explanation." 4 9 Certainly, not only is the ATS "a
143 See id. at 1669 (Breyer, J., concurring).
144 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671, 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 1668 (Breyer, J., concurring).
146 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886.
147 Joel Slawotsky, The Conundrum of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 40 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 175, 179 (2011) (referring to the appeal ruling).
148 See supra notes 120-146 and accompanying text.
149 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
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kind of legal Lohengrin[:] no one seems to know whence it
came,"' 5 0 but it is still difficult to say, 200 years after its
enactment, where it is actually going.
150 Int'l Invest. Trust v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
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